




It is now commonplace to assert that the law recognizes no second-class
citizens with respect to race, creed, color or national origin. Unfortunately,
this is not yet so with respect to national origin. Because of a set of old
naturalization treaties known as the Bancroft conventions, naturalized
Americans from twenty-one countries still risk losing their citizenship if they
return to their country of origin and remain there two years. The 1964
Supreme Court decision in Schneider v. Rusk' invalidated a section of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952,2 which stripped any naturalized
American of his citizenship after three years' continuous residence in his coun-
try of origin. But the Schneider decision did not touch loss of nationality pro-
visions in the Bancroft conventions which are essentially the same as the
statutory provisions struck down by the Court. The result subjects American
citizens from Bancroft convention countries to overseas residency restrictions
which apply to no other Americans, whether naturalized or native born.
History and Major Provisions
Conceived in an era when the right of individuals to renounce their national
allegiance was not widely acknowledged among the community of nations,'
the Bancroft conventions were a means of securing recognition by foreign
governments of the right of their nationals to become American citizens. 4
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tional Studies (SAIS) 1976; Third-year student, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington.
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'377 U.S. 163 (1964).
'Section 352(a)(1), 66 Stat. 269, 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1) (1952):
(a) A person who has become a national by naturalization shall lose his nationality by-
(I) having a continuous residence for three years in the territory of a foreign state of which
he was formerly a national or in which the place of his birth is situated ....
'See Agata, Involuntary Expatriation and Schneider v. Rusk, 27 U. PiT. L. REV. 1, 19-21
(1965).
4See GORDON & ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 20.7b (1977).
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From 1868 to 1937, the United States entered into twenty-six of these
agreements. Seventeen of them remain in force, including the multilateral In-
teramerican Convention of 1906.1
Named for George Bancroft, the American historian and diplomat who
negotiated the first of these treaties,' each agreement is reciprocal. Though not
identical, most Bancroft conventions have three major provisions. The first
specifies the terms under which each party will recognize the naturalization of
its citizens by the other. (Five years' uninterrupted residence in the country of
adoption is usually required to complete the naturalization process.) The
second provides that naturalized citizens of one party who return to their
native country shall remain liable to punishment for crimes committed before
emigration.
The third and most important provision holds that a naturalized citizen
who returns to his country of origin may be deemed to have resumed his
former nationality after two years' continuous residence.7 The main pur-
pose of this provision was to prevent naturalization from becoming a way
to avoid military service in one's native country.' Another purpose was to
limit the time during which a naturalized citizen living abroad could de-
mand the diplomatic protection of his adopted country. This consideration
was prompted by suspicions that some persons sought naturalization for
fraudulent purposes. It was feared that such persons would return to their
native country to live and pursue their business affairs, enjoying the ad-
'Bilateral treaties remain in force with Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Lithuania, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Sweden
and Uruguay. See BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1949, passim. Norway and Sweden are included in a single treaty in 1869
while the two countries were joined in a personal union under the Swedish crown. Cf Treaty on
Naturalization, May 26, 1869, United States-Sweden and Norway, 17 Stat. 809, T.S. No. 350. The
treaty is still in force with both countries. See Anderson v. Howe, 231 F. 546, 549 (D.C.N.Y.
1916).
The Interamerican Convention of 1906 (Aug. 13, 1906, 37 Stat. 1653, T.S. No. 575) remains in
force with Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua
and Panama. (Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay,
Oeru and Uruguay are no longer parties to the Convention.)
Treaties concluded with Austria-Hungary, Brazil, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the German
states of Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, the North German Confederation (Prussia) and Wurttemberg are
no longer in force. The treaties with each of the German states except Prussia became obsolete
when the German Empire was proclaimed in 1871. The treaties with Prussia and Austria-Hungary
were not revived after World War 1. Brazil, Mexico and the United Kingdom each denounced their
treaties according to the provisions governing termination. See BEVANS. supra.
'Treaty on Naturalization, Feb. 22, 1868, United States-North German Confederation, 15 Stat.
616, T.S. No. 261.
'The treaty with the United Kingdom was exceptional in that it did not fix an exact period of
residence after which resumption of the naturalized citizen's former nationality was to be pre-
sun,.fd. That determination was to be made according to the law of the country of origin. Treaty
on Naturalization, May 13, 1870, United States-United Kingdom, art. II, 16 Stat. 775, 776, T.S.
No. 130.
'3 Hackworth, DIOEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW'377 (1942). See also, Exparte Gilroy, 257 F. 110,
118 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
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vantages of two nationalities, but avoiding the obligations of each. 9 Arti-
cle III of the treaty with Portugal is typical of this type of provision:
If a Portuguese subject naturalized in America, renews his residence in Portugal,
without intent to return to America, he shall be held to have renounced his naturali-
zation in the United States. Reciprocally, if an American naturalized in Portugal
renews his residence in the United States, without intent to return to Portugal, he
shall be held to have renounced his naturalization in Portugal.
The intent not to return may be held to exist when the person naturalized in one coun-
try resides more than two years in the other country."
It must be emphasized that two years' residence by a naturalized citizen in
his country of origin does not result automatically in his losing his American
citizenship. I Instead, it gives rise to a presumption that he has voluntarily
abandoned his adopted nationality.' That presumption may be overcome by
evidence of an intention to return to the United States. Even a person who has
lived many years in his native country may avoid losing his American citizen-
ship provided he asserts and proves his intention to return to the United
States.' 3 In this respect, the language of the Bancroft conventions can be
distinguished from that of the statute declared unconstitutional in Schneider v.
Rusk. "
'For a discussion of the problem of fraud in obtaining American citizenship, see 2 Wharton,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 348-57 (2d ed. 1887), and 3 Hackworth, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 287-88 (1942).
"Treaty on Naturalization, May 7, 1908, United States-Portugal, art. III, 35 Stat. 2082,
2083-84, T.S. No. 513.
"See Agata, supra note 3 at 33.
"Two cases, Exparte Gilroy, 257 F. 110, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1919), and Anderson v. Howe, 231 F.
546, 548 (D.C.N.Y. 1916), have held that two years residence by a naturalized citizen in his native
country is merely prima facie evidence of abandonment of American citizenship under the Ban-
croft conventions.
"With specific reference to the treaty with Portugal (supra note 10), the State Department has
said:
Article III provides that a Portuguese subject naturalized in America shall be held to have re-
nounced his naturalization if he renews his residence in Portugal without intent to return to
America. Thus, foreign residence is not the sole criteria (sic] for finding loss of citizenship as in
INA [Immigration and Nationality Act] Section 352(a)(1). Rather, the determining factor is
whether the person intends to return to the United States. A person, for example, who asserts
his intention of returning to the United States and can substantiate this assertion with evidence,
can avoid loss of citizenship under Article III even if he has been residing in Portugal for many
years.
Operations Memorandum from State Department Passport Office to American Consulate,
Oporto, Portugal (Apr. 18, 1975). Haaland v. Att'y Gen., 42 F. Supp. 13 (D.C. Md. 1941), held
that residence in Norway for several years by a former Norwegian national naturalized in the
United States did not demonstrate an intent not to return to America.
'1n Schneider, a woman born in Germany emigrated to the United States with her parents while
she was a small child. At the age of sixteen, she acquired derivative American citizenship through
her parents' naturalization. She later married a German national and took up residence in Ger-
many. When the State Department denied her a passport on grounds that she had lost her citizen-
ship under the expatriation provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, she sought a
declaratory judgment in federal district court.
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Schneider v. Rusk
Section 352(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 made loss
of citizenship automatic after three years' residency in the country of origin,
though exceptions were enumerated in another part of the act.', In Schneider
v. Rusk, a majority of the Justices held this provision to be discriminatory and
therefore in violation of the Fifth Amendment's due process guaranty. Writing
for the majority, Justice Douglas declared:
This statute proceeds on the impermissible assumption that naturalized citizens as a
class are less reliable and bear less allegiance to this country than do the native born.
This is an assumption that is impossible for us to make. Moreover, while the Fifth
Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is
"so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499. A native-born citizen is free to reside abroad indefinitely without suffering loss
of citizenship. The discrimination aimed at naturalized citizens drastically limits their
rights to live and work abroad in a way that other citizens may. It creates indeed a
second-class citizenship. Living abroad, whether the citizen be naturalized or native
born, is no badge of lack of allegiance and in no way evidences a voluntary renuncia-
tion of nationality and allegiance. It may indeed be compelled by family, business or
other legitimate reasons.'
Despite the distinction between the automatic expatriation mechanism
of Section 352(a)(1) and the rebuttable presumption of voluntary ex-
patriation contained in the Bancroft conventions, the language of the
Douglas opinion makes it extremely doubtful that the latter would survive
a court test based on the Fifth Amendment." Like Section 352(a)(1), the
expatriation provisions of the treaties impose a burden on naturalized
citizens which is not shared by the native born. Moreover, the demise of
Section 352(a)(1) leaves persons whose status is governed by the Ban-
croft conventions subject to restrictions which no longer apply to
naturalized citizens as a class. The treaty provisions also contradict the
Douglas opinion in that they establish overseas residency as partial
evidence of voluntary renunciation of one's nationality.
But are the provisions of a treaty subject to the same tests of constitutionali-
ty which normally apply to statutes? Addressing this question in the 1957 case
of Reid v. Covert, '1 Justice Black declared that "no agreement with a foreign
nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Govern-
"See § 353, 66 Stat. 270, 8 U.S.C. § 1485 (1952).
'6377 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1964). (Italics supplied.)
"The Douglas opinion also would seem to cast doubt on the constitutionality of § 352(a)(2) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, which reads:
(a) A person who has become a national by naturalization shall lose his nationality by-
(2) having a continuous residence for five years in any other foreign state or states. ...
For a thorough survey of the impact of various Supreme Court decisions on other sections of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, see Master, United States Citizenship, 5 INT'L LAW. 324 (1971).
"354 U.S. 1.
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ment, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution. 9 Continuing,
Justice Black observed:
This court has ... repeatedly taken the position that an Act of Congress, which must
comply with the Constitution, is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute
which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of
the conflict renders the treaty null. It would be completely anomalous to say that a
tieaty need not comply with the Constitution when such an agreement can be overrid-
den by a statute that must conform to that instrument.2"
Thus, the constitutional objections to Section 352(a)(1) raised by Justice
Douglas in Schneider v. Rusk can be applied with equal force to the expatria-
tion provisions of the Bancroft conventions.
Yet the Fifth Amendment rationale of the Douglas opinion is not the only
basis for doubting the constitutionality of the expatriation provisions of the
Bancroft conventions. Three years after the Schneider decision, in Afroyim v.
Rusk,' 1 the Court again invalidated a loss of nationality statute, this time on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds.
Afroyim v. Rusk
Though any American, whether naturalized or native born, may voluntarily
renounce his citizenship, Congress has no power to divest persons of their
citizenship. This was the Supreme Court's holding in the 1967 case of Afroyim
v. Rusk, which knocked out Section 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940.22
Section 401(e) stripped Americans of their citizenship for voting in foreign
elections. In holding that Section 401(e) was contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment's grant of citizenship to "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the
United States," the Court explicitly overruled its 1957 decision in Perez v.
Brownell," which sustained the validity of that section. Writing for the ma-
jority in Afroyim, Justice Black declared
The Constitution ...grants Congress no express power to strip people of their
citizenship, whether in the exercise of the implied power to regulate foreign affairs or
in the exercise of any specifically granted power. And even before the adoption of the
"Id. at 16.
20Id. at 18 (footnote omitted).
2387 U.S. 253 (1967).
"Section 402(e), 54 Stat. 1168, as amended by 58 Stat. 746, 8 U.S.C. § 801(e) (1946). Re-enacted as
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 349(a)(5), 66 Stat. 267, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5):
(a) ... [A] person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization,
shall lose his nationality by-
(5) voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election to determine
the sovereignty over foreign territory. ...
23356 U.S. 44 (1957). Perez upheld the constitutionality of § 401(e) under the implied power of
Congress to regulate foreign relations. Writing for the majority in Perez, Justice Frankfurter cited
the Bancroft conventions as examples of the exercise of that power:
This series of treaties initiated this country's policy of automatic [sic] divestment of citizenship
for specified conduct affecting our foreign relations. Id. at 48.
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Fourteenth Amendment, views were expressed in Congress and by this Court that
under the Constitution the Government was granted no power, even under its express
power to pass a uniform rule of naturalization, to determine what conduct should
and should not result in the loss of citizenship. 2'
Justice Black concluded:
We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect every
citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship,
whatever his creed, color or race. Our holding does no more than to give to this
citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free coun-
try unless he voluntarly relinquishes that citizenship."
Afroyim was silent about what might constitute voluntary relinquishment of
one's citizenship. But an attorney general's opinion issued in 1969 concluded
that expatriation cannot be based on "an act which does not reasonably
manifest an individual's transfer or abandonment of allegiance to the United
States."'" The crucial question, therefore, in expatriation cases which arise
under the surviving sections of the Nationality Act, is whether a person by his
acts or declarations has manifested an intent to renounce his American citizen-
ship. 7
The Bankeroft Conventions After Afroyim v. Rusk
Because of the Afroyim decision, the same determination now must be made
in loss of nationality cases which might arise under the Bancroft conventions.
In order to establish loss of nationality under one of the treaties, it must be
shown that a naturalized American has taken up residence in his country of
origin without intent to return to America and for thepurpose of resuming his
former nationality or of abandoning his allegiance to the United States.2,
"387 U.s. 253, 257 (1967).
"Id. at 267.
1142 Op. ATry GEN. 34 (1969), reprinted in 34 Fed. Reg. 1079 (1969).
"The Attorney General's opinion further declared that voluntary relinquishment is not confined
to a written renunciation, but that "[i]t can also be manifested by other actions declared ex-
patriative under the [Nationality] Act, if such actions are in derogation of allegiance to this coun-
try." Id. But the opinion makes it clear that even in these cases, Afroyim permits the individual to
raise the issue of intent, thus shifting to the government the burden of proving that expatriation
has, in fact, occurred. Voluntary relinquishment means, of course, that the individual was free of
duress when he engaged in legislatively-defined expatriative conduct. Jolley v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946 (1971). But it also
has been interpreted to mean the presence of "specific subjective intent" to renounce American
citizenship. King v. Rogers, 463 F.2d 1188, 1189 (9th Cir. 1972). Accord, United States v.
Matheson, 532 F.2d 809, 814 (2d Cir. 1976). For an item-by-item analysis of the grounds for ex-
patriation under the Nationality Act of 1940, see Wasserman, The Voluntary Abandonment of
United States Citizenship, 17 S. TEX. L.J. 31, 40-66 (1975).
"The State Department Operations Memorandum (supra, note 13) issued to clarify the impact
of Schneider on the treaty with Portugal likewise offered guidance with regard to the effect of
Afroyim:
The Department also considers the Afroyim decision applicable to all determinations of Loss of
Nationality made in conjunction with Article III. Thus, not only must it be established that the
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Despite this additional safeguard against involuntary expatriation and
despite the best efforts of the Department of State's Passport Office to ad-
minister the treaty provisions with fairness," it seems completely contrary to
the spirit of Schneider and Afroyim that the Bancroft conventions remain in
force. Only four of the treaties-those with Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia and Lithuania 3°-still afford significant protections to
naturalized Americans native to these countries. An article in each of the four
treaties guarantees that naturalized Americans who return to their former
countries will not be punished either for the original act of emigration or for
failure to respond to calls for military service issued after they took up perma-
nent residence in the United States. 3' Because the potential value of such
guarantees from Eastern European countries with restrictive emigration
policies far outweighs the inconvenience imposed by the other treaty provi-
sions, these four Bancroft conventions ought to remain in force. The rest
should be abrogated.
Abrogating the Bancroft Conventions
Abrogation is a simple matter. All but one of the treaties provide for ter-
mination twelve months after one party notifies the other that it no longer
wishes to be bound. The exception is the treaty with Portugal, which requires
only six months' notice of an intention to terminate.3 2
Though the Constitution contains no provision regarding the power to
terminate treaties, it seems generally accepted that the President, acting alone,
may terminate a treaty which has come into conflict with the laws of the
United States; but amending or otherwise modifying a treaty requires the con-
sent of the Senate.3 Citing the Schneider and Afroyim decisions as authority,
subject does not intend to return to the United States as provided in the terms of the treaty, but
it must also be established under the Afroyim guidelines that the person, by residing in Portugal,
intended to transfer allegiance to the foreign state or intended to abandon allegiance to the
United States. As to this last point, the case must be fully developed in the same manner as in all
other loss of nationality cases.
"Richard H. Williams' Time to Review Some Naturalization Conventions, (May 1975) ap-
peared in issue 5 of Open Forum, a journal of opinion circulated within the Department of State
by the Secretary's Open Forum Panel.
"As of the date of the present paper, the United States has not recognized the incorporation of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Department of
State has regarded treaties between the United States and those countries as continuing in force.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8847, TREaATIES IN FORCE 171 (Jan. 1, 1976).
"See the following Naturalization Treaties: Apr. 5, 1932, United States-Albania, art. If, 49
Stat. 3241, 3242-43, T.S. No. 892; Nov. 23, 1923, United States-Bulgaria, art. II, 43 Stat. 1759,
1760, T.S. No. 684; July 16, 1928, United States-Czechoslovakia, ait. II, 46 Stat. 2424, 2425, T.S.
No. 804; and the United States-Lithuania, art. I, 53 Stat. 1569, 1570, T.S. No. 936.
"Treaty on Naturalization, May 7, 1908, United States-Portugal, art. IV, 35 Stat. 2082. 2084,
T.S. No. 513.
"See 14 Whiteman, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 460-64 (1970). Compare Goldwater,
Abrogating Treaties, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1977, at 37, col. 1.
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the President, without consulting the Senate, probably could invoke, as a
reason for abrogating the Bancroft conventions, if any were desired, the ra-
tionale that they are in conflict with basic concepts of our constitutional
system. But Presidential action pursuant to a Senate resolution would
doubtless raise fewer questions in that body. A more cumbersome alternative
to abrogation would be to seek the consent of the other parties to strike the
loss of nationality provisions, then obtain Senate approval of this modifica-
tion, treaty by treaty.
Conclusion
When the Bancroft conventions were signed, they provided important
safeguards for many naturalized Americans. Today, however, they symbolize
second-class citizenship for the very people they were meant to protect. The
principal function of the treaties-preventing foreign governments from im-
posing military obligations on naturalized Americans-has been superseded in
large part by other international agreements, most notably the 1930 Protocol
on Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality, which con-




"Protocol on Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality (opened for signature
Apr. 12, 1930), art. Il, 50 Stat. 1317, 1318, T.S. No. 913, 178 L.N.T.S. 227:
A person who has lost the nationality of a State under the law of that State and has acquired
another nationality, shall be exempt from military service in the State of which he has lost the
nationality.
Twenty-five countries, including the United States, are currently parties to the 1930 Protocol.
Cf. U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, PUB. No. 8847, TREATIES IN FORCE 394 (Jan. 1, 1976).
Four Bancroft Convention countries-Belgium, Colombia, El Salvador and Sweden-have
ratified the 1930 Protocol. Five others-Chile, Denmark, Peru, Portugal and Uruguay-have
signed the Protocol, but have not yet ratified it. Cf. United Nations, MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN
RESPECT OF WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITORY FUNCTIONS: LIST OF
SIGNATURES, RATIFICATIONS, ACCESSIONS, ETC. AS AT 31 DEC. 1976, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.D/10 (1977) 549.
Norway and Sweden are parties to separate bilateral agreements with the United States re-
specting military service of dual nationals: Treaty on Military Service, Nov. 1, 1930, United States-
Norway, 46 Stat. 2904, T.S. No. 832; Treaty on Military Service, Jan. 31, 1933, United States-
Sweden, 49 Stat. 3195, T.S. No. 890.
Argentina and Costa Rica are each party to separate bilateral treaties with the United States
which include provisions exempting each other's resident nationals from military service: Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, July 27, 1853, United States-Argentine Confedera-
tion, art. X, 10 Stat. 1005, 1009-10, T.S. No. 4; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation,
July 10, 1851, United States-Costa Rica, art. IX, 10 Stat. 916, 921, T.S. No. 62.
Honduras is party to a bilateral treaty with the United States which permits each country in time
of war to conscript the other's resident nationals who have declared their intention to become
naturalized in the country of residence: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights,
Dec. 7, 1927, United States-Honduras, art. VI, 45 Stat. 2618, 2622,, T.S. No. 764. This treaty
superseded an earlier one which exempted each other's resident nationals from military service:
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, July 4, 1864, United States-Honduras, art. IX,
13 Stat. 699, 704, T.S. No. 172. In 1957 the United States terminated a treaty with El Salvador
which contained an article identical to article VI of the 1927 treaty with Honduras: Treaty of
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Abrogating the Bancroft conventions would bring our treaty obligations in-
to conformity with Schneider and Afroyim and would permit greater uni-
formity in applying our citizenship laws. It also would end the lingering risk of
creating a small class of stateless persons through the operation of the
treaties-a risk created if another party to one of the treaties should refuse to
recognize an American "treaty victim" as having resumed his former na-
tionality after losing his American citizenship. Both in Afroyim and in the
1957 case of Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court has condemned laws which
might operate to produce statelessness.11
As children of immigrants, American traditionally have regarded immigra-
tion to this country as a "golden door" to the enjoyment of citizenship in a
free society. It is contrary to the spirit of America that the rights of any of its
citizens-indeed, their very right to remain citizens-should be abridged by
their national origin.
Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights, Feb. 22, 1926, United States-El Salvador, art. VI,
46 Stat. 2817, 2821, T.S. No. 827. When El Salvador rejected an American initiative to abrogate
article VI only, the two countries agreed to terminate the entire treaty. See 7 BEVANS, TREATIES
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1949, 521.
Seven Bancroft convention countries are not parties to the 1930 Protocol and have no separate
military service agreements with the United States: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador,
Haiti, Lithuania and Panama. The United States and Haiti once had a treaty which exempted each
other's resident nationals from military service, but it was terminated by Haiti in 1905. Treaty of
Amity,Commerce, Navigation, and Extradition, Nov. 3, 1864, United States-Haiti, art. V, 13
Stat. 711, 713, T.S. No. 164.
In a 1968 opinion, the Attorney-General concluded that the United States must continue to
recognize the treaty rights of resident aliens to exemption from military service. But the opinion
stated that treaty aliens are required to register with the Selective Service System and specifically
apply for relief under the treaties. Treaty aliens who apply for and receive exemptions are subject
to a statutory bar against eligibility for citizenship. 42 Op. ATTY GEN. 28 (1968).
"In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957), Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion strongly con-
demned loss of nationality as a punishment because it would lead to statelessness:
This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands. It subjects
the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress. He knows not what discriminations
may be established against him, what proscriptions may be directed against him, and when and
for what cause his existence in his native country may be terminated. He may be subject to
banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized people. He is stateless, a condition deplored
in the international community of democracies. It is no answer to suggest that all the disastrous
consequences of this fate may not be brought to bear on a stateless person. The threat makes the
punishment obnoxious. [Footnotes omitted.] Id. at 102.
Justice Black's opinion in Afroyim took similar note of statelessness as an unacceptable risk in
loss of nationality, creating an individual without country or protection. 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
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